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 PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-3733 
_____________ 
 
OMAR ALEJANDRO FRIAS-CAMILO,  
                              Petitioner 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                      Respondent  
_______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
United States Department of Justice 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA 1:A056-557-093) 
Immigration Judge: Hon. David Crosland 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 13, 2016 
 
Before:   AMBRO, JORDAN, and GREENBERG, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  June 23, 2016) 
_______________ 
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Raymond G. Lahoud 
Baurkot & Baurkot 
227 South 7th St. 
Easton, PA   18042 
          Counsel for Petitioner 
 
Aimee J. Carmichael 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
P. O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC 20044 
          Counsel for Respondent 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT  
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Omar Alejandro Frias-Camilo, a native and citizen of 
the Dominican Republic, petitions for review of a Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision finding him 
removable from the United States under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) due to a Pennsylvania conviction for a 
controlled substance offense.1  We will deny the petition. 
                                              
 1 The BIA further concluded that Frias-Camilo was 
ineligible for cancellation of removal because he had not 
demonstrated his physical presence in the United States for a 
period of seven years, as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2).  
It also adopted and affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision 
denying Frias-Camilo’s claims of asylum, withholding of 
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I. BACKGROUND 
 
 Frias-Camilo first entered the United States as a lawful 
permanent resident in 2006.  On July 23, 2013, he entered a 
plea of guilty in the Court of Common Pleas for Lehigh 
County, Pennsylvania to one count of conspiracy to possess a 
controlled substance, cocaine, in violation of 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 903 and 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-113(a)(16) (West).  
Frias-Camilo was originally sentenced to a twelve-month 
period of probation, but, sixteen months later, the court 
amended his sentence and imposed a sentence of “guilty 
without further penalty,” pursuant to 42 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 9723.2  That later order vacated several earlier-imposed 
punitive aspects of Frias-Camilo’s sentence, so he received no 
jail sentence, no term of probation, no community service, 
and owed no fines or fees.  Nonetheless, the order indicated 
that the court “finds the defendant guilty.”  (A.R. at 466.) 
 The Department of Homeland Security issued Frias-
Camilo a Notice to Appear, charging him with removability 
                                                                                                     
removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention 
Against Torture.  Frias-Camilo did not address any of these 
issues in his opening brief in this appeal, nor has he filed a 
reply brief.  Accordingly, any argument as to those portions 
of the BIA’s decision is waived.  Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 
488, 495 n.4 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 2 That statutory section, entitled “[d]etermination of 
guilt without further penalty,” provides: “If in the light of all 
the circumstances, probation would be appropriate under 
section 9722 (relating to order of probation), but it appears 
that probation is unnecessary, the court may impose a 
sentence of guilty without further penalty.” 
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pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), which makes 
deportable “[a]ny alien who at any time after admission has 
been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to 
violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or 
a foreign country relating to a controlled substance … .”3  
Frias-Camilo, through counsel, admitted before an 
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) the factual allegations in the Notice 
to Appear, but he filed a motion to terminate removal, 
arguing that the sentence of “guilty without further penalty” 
did not qualify as a “conviction” due to the absence of any 
restraint on his liberty.  The IJ denied his motion, and a 
second IJ denied his motion to reconsider.  After a hearing, a 
third IJ held Frias-Camilo to be removable, based on clear 
and convincing evidence.  The BIA dismissed his appeal, and 
Frias-Camilo timely filed the pending petition for review. 
 
                                              
 3 The Notice to Appear was issued on August 9, 2013.  
At that time, Frias-Camilo’s original sentence was in effect, 
as it had not yet been changed to “guilty without further 
penalty,” which did not occur until November 18, 2014.  The 
timing of that change in sentence has no bearing on our 
analysis here, however, as we conclude that Frias-Camilo’s 
changed sentence nonetheless resulted in a formal judgment 
of guilt. 
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II. DISCUSSION4 
 
 Frias-Camilo’s sole argument to this Court is the same 
as he raised below – that his Pennsylvania cocaine charge did 
not result in a “conviction” for a controlled substance offense 
because he received no actual punishment or restraint on his 
liberty.  We must reject that argument. 
 
 The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) defines 
the term “conviction” as follows: 
 
The term ‘conviction’ means, with respect to an 
alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien 
                                              
 4 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. 
1003.1(b)(3).  We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(1).  That jurisdictional statute limits the scope of 
our review to constitutional claims and questions of law.  8 
U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(B)-(D).  We may properly consider 
whether, as a matter of law, the disposition of Frias-Camilo’s 
Pennsylvania criminal charge constitutes a “conviction” for 
immigration purposes.  Acosta v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 218, 220 
(3d Cir. 2003). 
 In considering that question, we “review[] the 
agency’s conclusions of law de novo, ‘subject to established 
principles of deference.’”  Mendez-Reyes v. Att’y Gen., 428 
F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Wang v. Ashcroft, 368 
F.3d 347, 349 (3d Cir. 2004)).  Here, because the BIA’s 
decision was a single-member, non-precedential opinion, “we 
defer to its legal conclusions only insofar as they have the 
power to persuade.”  Singh v. Att’y Gen., 807 F.3d 547, 550 
(3d Cir. 2015). 
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entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has 
been withheld, where – 
 
(i) a judge or jury has found the alien 
guilty or the alien has entered a plea of 
guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted 
sufficient facts to warrant a finding of 
guilt, and 
 
(ii) the judge has ordered some form of 
punishment, penalty, or restraint on the 
alien’s liberty to be imposed. 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A); see Pinho v. Gonzalez, 432 F.3d 
193, 204-05 (3d Cir. 2005) (tracing the history of the INA’s 
definition of “conviction”).  We have previously emphasized 
the disjunctive nature of that definition – a conviction may 
consist of either a formal judgment of guilt or a withheld 
adjudication with some restraint on the alien’s liberty.  Perez 
v. Elwood, 294 F.3d 552, 562 (3d Cir. 2002).  Added to the 
INA by Congress in 1996, that second definition was meant 
to broaden the list of included convictions so that it covered 
cases in which an adjudication of guilt was deferred.5  Thus, 
                                              
 5 As the Conference Report on the amendments 
explained: 
 
[T]here exist in the various States a myriad of 
provisions for ameliorating the effects of a 
conviction.  As a result, aliens who have clearly 
been guilty of criminal behavior and whom 
Congress intended to be considered “convicted” 
have escaped the immigration consequences 
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under the INA, the presence of a restraint on liberty is only 
necessary when an adjudication of guilt has been withheld, 
but not when there is a formal judgment of guilt.  Since Frias-
Camilo’s Pennsylvania charge resulted in no restraint on his 
liberty, he may only be removable if it led to a formal 
judgment of guilt. 
 
 A formal judgment of guilt, for immigration purposes, 
is defined by reference to the definition of a “judgment of 
conviction” set out at Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
32(k)(1).  Perez, 294 F.3d at 562 (incorporating definition 
then found at subsection (d)(1) of Rule 32).  Under that Rule, 
“[a] judgment of conviction … must set forth the plea, the 
jury verdict or the court’s findings, the adjudication, and the 
sentence.  If the defendant is found not guilty or is otherwise 
entitled to be discharged, the court must so order.  The judge 
must sign the judgment, and the clerk must enter it.”  Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 32(k)(1). 
 
 Here, the record establishes that Frias-Camilo’s 
Pennsylvania controlled substance charge resulted in a formal 
judgment of guilt.  The charging document, a criminal 
                                                                                                     
normally attendant upon a conviction. … This 
new provision … clarifies Congressional intent 
that even in cases where adjudication is 
“deferred,” the original finding or confession of 
guilt is sufficient to establish a “conviction” for 
purposes of the immigration laws. 
 
H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-828 at 224.  We have referred to 
that as the “‘withheld judgment’ loophole.”  Pinho, 432 F.3d 
at 206. 
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information, includes a handwritten notation that Frias-
Camilo pleaded guilty to the cocaine conspiracy charge.  The 
amended sentencing order, signed by the sentencing judge, 
states that the court found him guilty and specifies the statute 
of conviction.  The record also includes the original 
sentencing order, as well as transcripts of the original plea 
colloquy and the hearing to amend the sentencing order.  
During the original plea hearing, Frias-Camilo explicitly pled 
guilty to the charge of conspiracy to possess cocaine and 
stated on the record that he admitted his guilt of that offense.6  
The original sentencing order confirms the sentence imposed 
and, by implication, the guilty plea that preceded it.  During 
the hearing to amend the sentencing order, Frias-Camilo’s 
counsel indicated that Frias-Camilo was aware of all of his 
rights at the original plea and sentencing, that he understood 
what was happening, and thus “no colloquy [was] necessary.”  
(A.R. at 520.)  At the conclusion of that hearing, the court 
entered the following order: “Now, this November 18th, 
2014, the Court, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. 9723, finds the 
defendant guilty without further penalty.”  (A.R. at 522.)  The 
amended sentencing order reflects that finding.  A formal 
judgment of guilt makes the imposition or omission of any 
punitive sanction irrelevant under the INA.  The judgment 
itself establishes Frias-Camilo’s “conviction” for purposes of 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A), and we need not consider whether 
any form of punishment was imposed.7 
                                              
 6 There was also a discussion on the record that the 
plea could potentially impact Frias-Camilo’s immigration 
status.  He indicated that he understood that the plea could 
affect his permanent resident status. 
 7 Given the clarity of that documentation, we reject 
Frias-Camilo’s contention that the judgment of guilt did not 
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 Against the weight of that evidence, Frias-Camilo 
insists that the vacatur of punitive aspects of his sentence 
somehow means that no “sentence” was ever imposed upon 
him.  As earlier noted, a “formal judgment of guilt” is 
comprised of a plea, finding, adjudication, and sentence.  
Perez, 294 F.3d at 562.  Focusing on the meaning of a 
“sentence,” Frias-Camilo argues that our previous 
incorporation of the definition of a “judgment of conviction” 
from the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure means that “the 
federal definition of ‘sentence’ is controlling as to whether a 
sentence has been issued in a particular case.”  (Opening Br. 
at 16 (original emphasis).)  Because the federal sentencing 
statute does not contemplate a finding of guilt with no further 
penalty, he argues, no “sentence” was ever imposed upon him 
as that term is defined under federal law.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3551(b) (listing, as possible federal sentencing options, 
terms of probation or imprisonment, a fine, forfeiture of 
property, and restitution).  To Frias-Camilo, if none of the 
sentencing options listed in § 3551(b) are ordered, no 
“sentence” is imposed, and thus no “formal judgment of 
guilt” can exist. 
 
 That argument does not withstand scrutiny.  Frias-
Camilo cites no authority for the notion that a state sentence 
must include one of the punitive options listed in § 3551(b) 
before it can be treated as a “sentence” under the INA.  Nor 
could he, as his argument runs headlong into the plain 
                                                                                                     
establish his plea or the adjudication of his charges.  Both 
requirements were amply met by the documents submitted in 
support of Frias-Camilo’s Pennsylvania conviction – Frias-
Camilo was adjudicated guilty, after a guilty plea, on the 
charge of conspiracy to possess cocaine. 
10 
 
language of that statute.  In essence, Frias-Camilo contends 
that no “judgment of guilt” can exist without some punitive 
sanction.  Congress, however, explicitly excluded a 
punishment requirement from the first definition of a 
“conviction” while including it in the second definition.  See 
Acosta v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 218, 222 n.6 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(“Congress intended that Section [1]101(a)(48)(A) be 
afforded its plain meaning.”).  The statutory language, in fact, 
leaves little to the imagination.  The INA’s first definition of 
a “conviction” provides that a “formal judgment of guilt,” 
standing alone, establishes the existence of a conviction.8  See 
Viveiros v. Holder, 692 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2012) (rejecting 
“out-of-hand the petitioner’s suggestion that there was no 
‘formal judgment of guilt’ because he was never ultimately 
                                              
 8 The primary decision that Frias-Camilo cites in 
support of his argument is inapposite.  In Matter of 
Marroquin-Garcia, 23 I. & N. Dec. 705 (A.G. 2005), the 
Attorney General considered whether the phrase “formal 
judgment of guilt” should include convictions that are later 
vacated.  In concluding that vacated convictions should 
nonetheless qualify as “convictions” under the INA, the 
Attorney General cited the second definition of a conviction 
present in § 1101(a)(48)(A) for situations in which an 
adjudication is withheld but a restraint on liberty is still 
imposed.  That definition “ensures that a defendant who has 
been found guilty of unlawful conduct, and has been punished 
for that conduct, will not avoid deportation by utilizing a state 
court procedure that spares the defendant from technically 
being adjudged ‘convicted.’”  Id. at 715.  That case did not 
eliminate the first statutory definition of a conviction; it 
merely relied upon the second definition as support for its 
conclusion regarding vacated convictions. 
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punished for his shoplifting crime”).  Nothing further is 
required. 
 
 A “sentence” is merely “[t]he judgment that a court 
formally pronounces after finding a criminal defendant guilty; 
the punishment imposed on a criminal wrongdoer.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  Here, the punishment 
finally imposed on Frias-Camilo was the judgment of 
conviction itself.  Although Pennsylvania’s “guilty without 
further penalty” formulation may not have a federal 
counterpart, it is included among the sentencing options 
enumerated in Pennsylvania’s statute governing criminal 
sentencing.  See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9721(a)(2).9  That 
sentencing option recognizes that 
 
[i]n some instances, the court may decide that 
the needs of justice are fulfilled by a 
determination of guilt alone, without necessity 
for further penalty.  The shame and trauma of 
public conviction may be punishment enough 
and there may be no need of any plan for 
“reformation” or control.  In such cases, the 
courts should be free to make such a judgment 
without requiring useless probation. 
 
Commonwealth v. Rubright, 414 A.2d 106, 109 (Pa. 1980).  
Beyond such shame and trauma, a finding of guilt without 
further penalty can also have significant collateral 
                                              
 9 Given the explicit reference to that option in 
Pennsylvania’s sentencing statute, we reject Frias-Camilo’s 
additional contention that “guilty without further penalty” is 
not intended as a “sentence” under Pennsylvania law. 
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consequences, as the very existence of this removal 
proceeding makes clear.  We do not hesitate to conclude that 
a sentence of “guilty without further penalty” is a “sentence” 
for purposes of the INA. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
 The record from Frias-Camilo’s Pennsylvania 
controlled substance case establishes his plea, the court’s 
findings, the sentence, and the adjudication of that charge.  As 
such, a “formal judgment of guilt” was entered against him, 
establishing his “conviction” as defined by 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(48)(A).  Perez, 294 F.3d at 562.  That conviction is 
for a controlled substance offense – conspiracy to possess 
cocaine – that renders Frias-Camilo removable from the 
United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).10  We will 
therefore deny his petition for review. 
                                              
 10 Frias-Camilo does not dispute that the cocaine 
charge qualified as a controlled substance offense as defined 
in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). 
